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Resumen 
 El objetivo de este artículo es profundizar sobre la relación teórica entre el comercio internacional 
y el medio ambiente. Mediante un modelo duopolístico, una empresa doméstica y otra extranjera 
compiten en el mercado doméstico produciendo un bien homogéneo con tecnologías de 
producción diferenciadas. En este contexto, examino el efecto de la protección administrada sobre 
la decisión de la empresa doméstica por adoptar o no una tecnología medioambientalmente 
limpia. La autoridad comercial elige el nivel de protección mediante un arancel específico antes de 
que la empresa doméstica decida su nivel de producción, pero después de que ésta opta por la 
adopción. Al ser una política de segundo mejor, la protección administrada genera pérdida de 
bienestar. Pese a esta distorsión, con la adopción, la disminución en la externalidad compensa el 
costo de adoptar la tecnología más limpia. Para la autoridad comercial, el conservar la credibilidad 
de la protección administrada, evita efectos negativos que exacerban procesos de apertura 
comercial sobre el medio ambiente: una política de libre comercio podría ser nociva para la 
empresa doméstica, ya que los incentivos para adoptar, son nulos. 
JEL Classiﬁcation: F18. 
Key Words: Cournot Competition, Managed Trade and Pollution. 
Managed Trade and Environmental Policy under Imperfect Competition 
Abstract 
This paper aims to deepen the theoretical relationship between international trade and the 
environment. I design a duopolistic competition model where a domestic and a foreign firm 
compete in the domestic market with homogeneous products and differentiated production 
technologies. In this context, I examine the effect that managed trade has on the domestic firm's 
choice to adopt or not an environmental-friendly technology. The commercial authority decides 
the level of protection applying a specific trade tax before the domestic firm determines its 
production level, but after the domestic firm makes its choice to adopt or not the cleaner 
technology. This second-best policy leads to welfare losses. Nevertheless, the decrease in the 
monopolistic distortion and the production externality, compensates for the costs associated with 
the adoption of the cleaner technology. For the policy maker, to remain credible regarding the 
managed trade protection, avoids negative effects that may exacerbate opening trade processes 
upon the environment: a free-trade policy could be counterproductive for the domestic firm to 
adopt, since the incentives to adopt are null. 
Clasiﬁcación JEL: F18. 
Palabras clave: Competencia Cournot, Comercio administrado y Contaminación. 
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1. Introduction 
Two significant trends in the international trade arena and some outstanding strategic trade 
reforms followed by several advanced and emerging countries have shaped nowadays 
international trade's architecture and its dynamism. 
On the one hand, since the end of the Second World War, countries have engaged in major global 
trade negotiations that in subsequent trade rounds have resumed under the Doha Round, 
promoting under the most favored nation principle (MFN), a number of multilateral taxes and 
subsidies reductions. 
On the other hand, episodes of high volatility observed in the international financial markets 
associated with an unfavorable evolution of financial and economic conjunctural indicators, have 
had significant spillover effects on the pace of expansion of international trade. To compensate for 
fluctuations in trade flows, policy makers have managed trade protection granting in some cases, 
even more safety, than otherwise it would have been observed, if strategic protection could have 
been acknowledged as a result of a non-cooperative equilibrium among trade partners. 
In this context, however, it is not sufficiently clear if the extra protection granted based on less 
dynamic international trade flows is more distortionary than that awarded in episodes of a 
significant pace of expansion of the global economic activity. The former argument calls for a 
counter-cyclical protectionism, while the latter argument, calls for a pro-cyclical protectionism, 
both forms being well known by their welfare-loss consequences2. 
The effects of protectionism on welfare must be analyzed in the light of the number of strategic 
trade reforms we have witnessed during the last two decades that in general have taken two 
broad approaches: i) unilateral, bilateral or multilateral reforms, some of them yet to be 
implemented; and ii) second and even third best reforms to partially correct trade distortions or 
some other externalities in production and consumption in specific sectors. 
In this paper, I present a duopolistic competition model where a domestic and a foreign firm 
compete in the domestic market with homogeneous products and differentiated production 
technologies. The domestic firm has a pollutant technology, while the foreign firm is assumed to 
have an environmental-friendly technology. In this context, I design a mechanism that provides 
incentives for the domestic firm to adopt a cleaner technology with the aim to reduce domestic 
pollution. In doing so, I investigate if administered protection, as a trade policy, partially corrects 
the production externality in a second-best fashion, where the domestic government has a limited 
commitment to provide the proposed administered protection, and if domestic firms are willing to 
adopt the cleaner technology in the absence of an explicit environmental policy designed with a 
first best approach. I analyze this assumption finding that there is an optimal trade tax that 
credibly provides the incentives for domestic firms to adopt the cleaner technology of production. 
Though the administered protection clearly generates some welfare losses, the expected 
reduction of the production externality compensates these losses via welfare gains3. 
                                                          
2
 For an empirical analysis of counter and pro-cyclical protectionism see Bagwell and Staiger (2003). 
3
 For a recent and detailed survey on trade-related environmental issues, see De Melo (2014) and Frankel 
(2009). 
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In this context, I examine the theoretical relationship between administered trade through a trade 
tax and an environmental policy designed to adopt a cleaner technology in a polluted open 
economy with endogenous pollution levels, assuming that the government actually has a very 
limited commitment credibility. In so doing, I propose a three-stage game: i) during the first stage, 
the domestic firm decides whether to adopt or not the cleaner technology, ii) in the second stage 
the domestic government chooses the degree of administered trade protection, and iii) in the 
third stage domestic and foreign firms compete à la Cournot in the domestic market. 
The basic insight of the model relies upon the fact that unless the government credibly threatens 
granting administered protection, the domestic firm would not adopt the cleaner technology. 
Therefore, the objective is twofold: on the one hand, the domestic government has a clear 
incentive to protect a cleaner firm, than to protect a pollutant one; and on the other hand, the 
firm would adopt the cleaner technology if it has enough confidence about the government's 
commitment. In this context, a free trade policy would be unfavorable because it would provide 
no elements to make credible the government's threat, whereas an autarky situation will not 
contribute to switch on the mechanism linking pollution and trade. 
Following Regibeau and Gallegos (2004), Brander and Spencer (1985), Eaton and Grossman (1986), 
Dixit (1983) and Spencer and Brander (1983), this paper considers a duopolistic competition 
between firms combined with strategic interaction between domestic and foreign governments in 
imposing optimal trade and environmental policies. The distinction between the previous works 
on strategic interaction is that the model developed here, considers that the production of the 
final tradeable good generates certain amount of pollution, which is assumed to be proportional 
to the output levels; and it only harms consumers, not neighboring firms or countries. Therefore, 
no transboundary pollution is considered. In that sense, environmental authorities design 
strategically an optimal environmental policy to deal only with domestic pollution. 
Ludema and Takeno (2007), propose a model where unilateral tariffs are designed to induce 
foreign firms to adopt more environmental-friendly technologies assuming there is a negative 
cross-border externality on production coming from the foreign country. Despite the non-
environmental purpose of several international examples of this type of policy intervention, the 
implication is that unilateral tariffs can be partially effective environmental policies4. 
This basic insight is analyzed formally in a two-country partial equilibrium model. The emphasis is 
on the domestic market of one of the two countries. This market can be served by n domestic 
firms and m foreign firms. Initially, I will take these numbers as exogenously determined, starting 
with n=1=m. Later on, I will endogenize them. Domestic production creates an amount of pollution 
proportional to domestic output: the cleaner the technology, the lower these pollution levels will 
be. As foreign firms serve the market through exports, they do not generate any local pollution. 
However, unlike Spencer and Brander (1983), Brander and Spencer (1985) and Eaton and 
Grossman (1986), to analyze the strategic interaction between a credible threat and possible 
                                                          
4
Ludema and Takeno (2007), provides some examples of such instruments, for instance to induce the 
adoption of fishing devices with the aim to avoid dolphins or turtle mortality. The Tuna-Dolphin WTO Case, 
is the best example of how those restrictions have been discriminatory and have provided disguised trade 
protection to the US. 
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improvements in social welfare through commitments granted by the government, the timing of 
the granted protection is crucial. In this paper, I assume that the domestic government has a 
limited commitment. In so doing, I suppose that firms choose their output levels in the third stage 
as is usual, i.e., just after the government chooses its trade policy. The main difference is that I 
allow the domestic firm to choose the kind of technology before trade policies are set up. 
In a three-stage model with no transboundary pollution, Xing (2006) examines the strategic effects 
that lenient environmental policies on exporting countries have on the design of environmental 
policies in importing countries, and finds that the strategic behavior of the exporting country leads 
to the application of optimal environmental tariffs on imports from countries with lax 
environmental regulations5. Iida and Takeuchi (2011) propose a four-stage model to influence a 
domestic-polluting firm to adopt a cleaner technology of production from the foreign, depending 
on the concern the domestic country has on the environmental damage if the domestic firm does 
not use the cleaner technology. Iida and Takeuchi (2011) propose that if the country cares about 
the environmental damage, a policy of free trade is better compared to a tariff policy with the aim 
to achieve the technological transfer: the cost of free trade is that there would be no tariff 
revenue, but the gain is a lower license fee to use the cleaner technology. 
The plan of the paper is the following. In the second section I develop a duopolistic model with 
two firms competing in the domestic market with a homogeneous product. The domestic country 
faces domestic pollution and chooses the mechanism to credible threaten its limited commitment 
to protect cleaner production technologies. In the third section, the model is extended to include 
n domestic and m foreign firms to determine endogenously the optimal number of adopting firms. 
In the fourth section I present the main conclusions and some comments on further research. 
 
2. The Model 
The framework for the analysis I build consists on a domestic country assumed to be a small open 
economy and a net importer of the final homogenous good initially produced by two firms 
competing each other in a Cournot-Nash fashion only in the domestic country. The domestic firm 
produces the homogeneous good with a pollutant technology whereas the foreign firm already 
produces it with an environment-friendly technology. Because the domestic country faces 
domestic pollution, only the domestic government is assumed to choose the mechanism to 
credibly threaten its commitment to protect cleaner production technologies. This is done by 
maximizing a social welfare function that accounts for the effects of the trade tax on the consumer 
surplus, the benefits of the domestic firms, plus the tax revenue net of pollution costs. 
The domestic country is assumed to consume the final good and initially, is modelled using a 
general specification for the inverse demand function P(Q), where Q=q₁+q₂. I also assume 
                                                          
5
In its three-stage model Xing (2006) explains that the optimal environmental tax strategically affects the 
environmental-lax exporting country, conditioning its environmental policies. In this context, Xing (2006) 
justifies the implementation of environmental taxes when exporting countries have an artificial comparative 
advantage due to the poor environmental regulation. 
Revista Mexicana de Economía y Finanzas, Vol. 12, No. 3, (2017), pp. 29-44 
 
symmetric cost structures and constant marginal costs equal to zero between firms (c=0), to 
eliminate the strategic-trade associated effects6. 
The foreign firm's export-oriented production, constitutes the domestic country's imports. Trade 
policy takes the form of a specific trade tax (t). The home country is the only one with an active 
trade policy. The case for one domestic firm competing with one foreign firm will show some of 
the basic insights of this model. Later on, a more general case where n domestic and m foreign 
firms interact each other, will be shown. The home firm is indexed as firm 1, while the foreign firm 
is indexed as firm 2. The foreign firm does not pollute in the domestic country, because no 
transboundary pollution is considered. In this context, the "polluting" technology generates local 
pollution, while the "clean" technology does not. 
A continuum of technology adoption decisions is available, so that I index the adoption choice. A 
technology adoption choice θ is associated with each point on the interval [0,1]. Two benchmark 
cases can be characterized: a firm that does not adopt the cleaner technology, and a firm that 
does adopt the cleaner technology7. Therefore, the social welfare cost of pollution is directly 
proportional to local output in the domestic country. In this context, the credible threat that the 
government makes, influences the decision the domestic firm takes to fully or partially adopt the 
cleaner technology, or not adopt at all. 
As previously mentioned, the parameter θ belongs to the interval [0,1]. If the domestic firm fully 
adopts the cleaner technology θ=0, and pollution emissions are θq₁=0. This means that if the 
cleaner technology is totally adopted, it will actually eliminate all pollution8. If the home firm 
partially adopts the cleaner technology θ∈(0,1) and θq₁∈(0,q₁). Finally, if the domestic firm does 
not adopt the cleaner technology, θ=1 and θq₁=q₁. 
I also assume that the home firm is initially endowed with the pollutant technology but it can 
adopt the cleaner technology at a fixed cost F. Likewise, I assume that the choice of technology 
does not affect the marginal costs of production9. 
In this context, the home country's government is free to set its tariff at any level it wishes 
whereas the domestic firm must decide whether to keep its current polluting technology or to 
adopt the new cleaner one at a cost F, in the first stage. In the second stage the domestic 
government decides the level of protection to grant through a specific trade tax t. In the third 
stage firms simultaneously choose their output levels in a Cournot-Nash fashion. Once the game is 
set up, it is solved for its unique sub-game perfect equilibrium10. 
2.1 Third stage: firms compete à la Cournot 
                                                          
6
If the choice of technology affected the marginal costs, policies aimed at reducing would also affect the 
"aggressiveness" of the domestic firms. 
7
 These benchmark cases reflect that firms can fully, partially or do not adopt at all the cleaner technology. 
8
 This eliminates the traditional "scale" effect associated with trade. 
9
 With this I avoid strategic trade-like effects. 
10
 The proposed sequence assumes that in general, firms and governments pursue their self-interest looking 
ahead by themselves. See Brander and Spencer (1987). 
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It is well known that under Cournot conjectures, each firm believes that its counterpart will hold 
its output fixed while the output level of that firm changes11. In this context, profit functions for 
each of the firms take the following form: 
π₁(q₁,q₂)=P(Q)q₁-F          (1) 
π₂(q₁,q₂,t)=P(Q)q₂-tq₂   (2) 
for the foreign firm12. 
Where F stands for the fixed cost of adopting the cleaner technology, and t is the specific trade 
tax. Reaction functions are obtained directly from: ∂πi/∂qi=π qi=0, for any i=1,2. 
πq₁(q₁,q₂)=P(Q)+q₁P′(Q)=0        (3) 
πq₂(q₁,q₂,t)=P(Q)+q₂P′(Q)-t=0   (4) 
With second order conditions ∂/∂qi[∂πi/∂qi]=πqiqi<0,for any i=1,2, and∂/∂qi[∂πi/∂qj]=πqiqj<0, for any 
i≠j 
πq₁q₁=2P′(Q)+q₁P′′(Q)<0      (5) 
πq₂q₂=2P′(Q)+q₂P′′(Q)<0 (6) 
In order to know the effect of the trade tax t on the production levels q₁ and q₂, I totally 
differentiate eqs. (3) and (4) to obtain the signs for dq₁/dt and dq₂/dt: 
πq₁q₁dq₁+πq₁q₂dq₂+πq₁tdt=0     (7) 
πq₂q₁dq₁+πq₂q₂dq₂+πq₂tdt=0     (8) 
Since πq₁t=0 and πq₂t=-1, the system can be solved simultaneously to obtain: 
dq₁/dt=-πq₁q₂)/Δ>0    (9) 
dq₂/dt=πq₁q₁/Δ<0     (10) 
where Δ=πq₁q₁πq₂q₂-πq₂q₁πq₁q₂>0
13. Provided the Routh-Hurwitz condition for reaction function stability 
is in place, eqs. (9) and (10) clearly show that an increase in the trade tax t, leads to a domestic 
output increase, and to a foreign output decrease. 
 
2.2 Second stage: choosing the optimal trade tax 
At this point that the home government is the only policy active, to choose the optimal trade tax, 
it maximizes the following social welfare function: 
W(t,θ)=CS+PS+TR-PC      (11) 
                                                          
11
This means that dqi/dqj=0, for any i≠j. 
12
 Foreign firm exports to the domestic country which has an import tariff in place. 
13
 Worth noting is that "cross effects" are weaker than "own effects" on the decline of the marginal revenue, 
i.e., πqiqi<πqiqj,for any i≠j. 
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where CS stands for consumer surplus, PS for producer surplus, TR for tariff revenue and PC for 
pollution costs. In other words, the social welfare function takes the next explicit form: 
W(t,θ)=∫₀
QP(Q)dQ-P(Q)Q+π₁(q₁,q₂)+tq₂-θq₁    (12) 
As is usual, eq. (12) considers consumer and producer surpluses and tariff revenues net of social 
costs of pollution (tq₂-θq₁). 
For a given level of the technological parameter, the domestic government performs 
dW(t,θ)/dt=014.As I expected, the trade tax has the very well-known negative effect on the 
consumer surplus: 
d/dt[∫₀
QP(Q)dQ-P(Q)Q]=-QP′[πq₁q₁-πq₁q₂/Δ]<0     (13) 
a positive effect on the producer surplus15. 
dπ₁(q₁,q₂)/dt=q₁P′πq₁q₁/Δ>0(14) 
and a positive effect on the tariff revenue net of pollution costs as well: 
d[tq₂-θq₁]/dt=tπq₁q₁/Δ+q₂-q₁(dθ/dt)>0      (15) 
as long as dθ/dt<0, the effect of the trade tax on the tariff revenue net of pollution costs is positive 
as well, and if the government's commitment is credible and the trade tax provides the sufficient 
incentives to fully adopt the cleaner technology dθ/dt=016. 
With these inputs, the government's tax choice affects the balance between these positive and 
negative effects: should positive effects more than compensate the negative effect on the 
consumer surplus, the effect of the managed trade using a trade tax on the social welfare would 
clearly be positive17. 
In any case, the optimal tax will be a function of the indexed parameter θ, i.e.,topt=t(θ) where 
θ∈[0,1]. 
In this freely managed trade regime, the protection will be stronger, the lower the parameter θ is. 
Therefore, for each technological choice within the interval [0,1] there is an optimal trade tax, 
                                                          
14
     Since:dQ₁/dt=dq₁/dt+dq₂/dt=πq₁q₁-πq₁q₂/Δ<0 because Q₁=q₁+q₂, and πq₁q₁<πq₁q₂ 
   ∂π₁/∂q₁=0 by (3) 
   ∂π₁/∂q₂=q₁P′(Q₁) by (1) 
∂π₁/∂t=0 because t is an opcmal trade tax on imports, 
   dq₂/dt=πq₁q₁/Δ<0 by (10) 
   dq₁/dt=-πq₁q₂/Δ>0 by (9). 
15Notice that dπ₁(q₁,q₂)/dt=(∂π₁/∂q₁)(dq₁/dt)+(∂π₁/∂q₂)(dq₂/dt), if ∂π₁/∂q₁=0, then 
dπ₁(q₁,q₂)/dt=(∂π₁/∂q₂)(dq₂/dt). With Cournot conjectures also remember that dq₁/dq₂=0. 
16
 Equation (15) shows a positive effect on the tariff revenue net of pollution costs, considering that the level 
of the optimal trade tax is not prohibitive. 
17
 A strong negative effect coming from the consumer surplus would be counterproductive, just as it would 
be a policy of free trade in the sense that the mechanism that triggers the adoption of the cleaner 
technology is the credible threat that the government could protect the firm which is adopting the cleaner 
technology granting some administered trade protection. 
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which according to the assumptions made, it will grant its highest protection when θ=0, therefore, 
the optimal trade tax, will be in the range: topt∈max[t(θ=1),t(θ=0)]. 
In the general case,we have: 
dW(t,θ)/dt=0⇒ 
topt=QP′[πq₁q₁-πq₁q₂]-[q₁P′+q₂Δ/πq₁q₁]-θπq₁q₂/πq₁q₁≥0       (16) 
which clearly is positive when θ=0, i.e., when the domestic firm has fully adopted the cleaner 
technology. 
2.3 First stage: adopting the technology 
Adopting the environment-friendly technology has naturally to be assessed in two ways: from the 
firm's perspective and from a social-welfare point of view. Firstly, the net gain of adopting the 
cleaner technology must be non-negative: 
π₁(q₁,q₂;θ=0)-π₁(q₁,q₂;θ=1)≥F       (17) 
Equation (17) compares the net gain of adopting the environment-friendly technology: the greater 
the granted managed trade protection through a higher trade tax associated with a low pollution 
parameter θ, the higher the possibility that it would lead to an adoption choice for a given sunk 
cost F, provided the net gain function be non-negative. 
Secondly, if the technology adoption parameter is indexed and θ ∈ [0,1], the trade tax would be 
zero if the domestic firm does not adopt the clean technology. Therefore, as Regibeau and 
Gallegos (2004) pointed out, a free-trade policy would be harmful for the environment as long as 
there would be no incentives for the domestic firm to adopt the cleaner technology. 
Naturally, at this point I will look for the level of the optimal trade tax and the resultant tariff 
revenue that compensates for the welfare loss on the consumer surplus due to the application of 
the trade tax. The answer to this question is strongly linked with the value the pollution parameter 
θ takes, and the level of imports from the foreign country q₂. Strategically, if the credible threat of 
granting managed trade protection is taken for acknowledged by the domestic firm and it fully 
adopts the cleaner technology, the trade tax chosen by the government, is expected to provide 
the highest protection18. 
In the context of the managed trade protection proposed here, the combination of these two 
effects, points to a result where an optimal trade tax must be higher than that obtained from a 
non-cooperative game solution where the domestic firm does not necessarily adopt the cleaner 
technology. The explanation is straightforward: if the mechanism linking pollution and trade does 
not provide the incentive to adopt the cleaner technology through the credible threat, there is no 
                                                          
18
 This does not mean that trade revenues will be at their highest level as well, because whereas t is a 
decreasing function of θ, q₂ is an increasing function of θ, so that the higher the pollution parameter is, the 
greater the level of imports will be, but the lower the tariff revenue will result as well. On the other hand, 
being q₁ and q2 perfect substitutes, their levels depend on the parameter θ. If the domestic firm adopts, θ=0 
and q₁is expected to be higher than q₂. If the domestic firm does not adopt, θ=1 and q₁ is expected to be 
equal to q₂, because t would be zero. 
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reason to adopt it19. The limited commitment of the government to provide protection is 
acknowledged by the domestic firm when trade protection is administered to finally adopt the 
cleaner technology, but not when the local government does not have such a mechanism. In that 
case, it might be unfavorable to adopt the cleaner technology at the sunk cost F, because there 
would be insufficient incentives to adopt it. In other words, the optimal trade tax between the 
managed trade regime and the non-cooperative solution is in the range: 
topt(θ)∈max{t(θ=1),t(θ=0)} for θ∈[0,1]        (18) 
where t(θ=1) is the optimal tax when the domestic firm does not adopt (non-cooperative 
solution), whereas t(θ=0) is the level of trade tax that emerges from the adoption. In the first case 
t=0, whereas in the second case t is at its highest level20. 
Proposition 1: In this model, managed trade provides the strongest ex-post protection. The non-
cooperative solution including any possible trade liberalization lowers the domestic firm's 
incentives to adopt the cleaner technology. 
Proof: 
i) For the small open economy case, the non-cooperative solution for an optimal trade tax is: t
opt
=0, 
ii) Any free trade policy would set t=0, and 
iii) Any trade liberalization will not provide more incentives for the domestic firm to adopt than the 
freely managed trade regime. 
At this point, the question that naturally arises is if tariff revenues net of pollution costs do really 
compensate for the welfare loss associated with the negative effect of the trade tax on the 
consumer surplus. To answer to this question, the appropriate measure to compare is the change 
in tariff revenue net of pollution costs plus the change in producer surplus vis-à-vis the change in 
consumer surplus, i.e., 
Δ{PS+TR-PC}≥ΔCS      (19) 
as long as the change in the left-hand side of the eq. (19), more than compensates the change in 
the right-hand side, the tariff revenue net of pollution costs plays its role. 
Proposition 2: Managed trade protection increases the domestic price and the domestic profit, 
reduces the foreign profit, maximizes the trade tax, and increases tariff revenues net of pollution 
costs after adoption. 
                                                          
19
 This is also true, whether I use a framework of a small or a big open economy. 
20 Notice that in the model the domestic country is a small open economy where by definition 
topt=0. If the domestic country were a big open economy, therefore having some market power to 
fix international reference relative prices, the optimal tax would be topt=1/ε∗, being ε∗ the very 
well-known price elasticity of the foreign offer curve. In this case:topt(θ)∈max{t(θ=1),t(θ=0)} for 
θ∈[0,1] should be strictly greater than topt=1/ε∗. Failing to do so in the managed trade protection 
regime, firms would not adopt the cleaner technology, because an optimal level of protection is 
already given. 
Nueva Época REMEF (TheMexicanJournal of Economics and Finance) 
Proof:  
i) The increase in the price is given by the following expression: 
dP/dt=P′(dq₁/dt+dq₂/dt)=P′(πq₁q₁-πq₁q₂/Δ)>0; 
ii) The increase in the domestic profit follows from: 
dπ₁/dt=(∂π₁/∂q₁)(dq₁/dt)+(∂π₁/∂q₂)(dq₂/dt)=q₁P′πq₁q₁/Δ)>0; 
iii) The reduction in the foreign profit from: 
dπ₂/dt=q₂P′dq₁/dt-q₂=-q₂(1+P′πq₁q₂/Δ)<0; 
iv) The maximization of the trade tax from adopting or not the cleaner technology, where: 
topt(θ)∈max{t(θ=1),t(θ=0)} for each θ∈[0,1]. 
v) The increase in tariff revenues net of pollution costs: 
d[tq₂-θq₁]/dt=tπq₁q₁/Δ+q₂-q₁dθ/dt>0. 
2.4 Private vs. social incentives 
Analyzing the firm's incentive to adopt the cleaner technology and the social incentives to adopt it 
naturally leads us to ask if there is a threshold where the negative effect of the administered 
protection on the consumer surplus could more than compensate for the remaining positive 
effects considering there is a sunk cost of adoption as well. As I have already mentioned, the 
incentive domestic private firms have to adopt the environmental-friendly technology can be 
obtained by simply comparing the firm's benefits against the sunk cost F. 
Φ₁=π₁(θ=0)-π₁(θ=1)≥F         (20) 
In this way, the private incentive for the domestic firm, i.e., the difference between the benefits of 
adopting and not adopting, should be no less than the sunk cost F. 
I will assume that this is the case, and then I will compare the change in the social welfare of 
adopting the cleaner technology net of the private incentives. Therefore, the change in the social 
welfare net of the private incentives becomes: 
ΔW-(Φ₁-F)=ΔCS+Δ(TR-PC)       (21) 
The first term on the right-hand side of eq. (21) is the change in the consumer surplus. This term is 
clearly negative since adopting the cleaner technology means to face higher domestic prices 
reflecting the administered protection given by the government. The second term on the right-
hand side is the change in the tariff revenue net of pollution costs. This term has two elements: 
one that not always is an increasing function of θ, i.e., the tariff revenue ΔTR, because it depends 
on the value the pollution parameter θ takes21.The second one is the change in the cost associated 
                                                          
21
 The pollution parameter is a continuous variable taking values between 0 and 1, tariff revenues would 
take a maximum and then would decline to zero as long as θ approaches to 1.Therefore, for "high" values of 
θ, adoption clearly increases tariff revenues, whereas for "low" values of θ, adoption naturally decreases 
tariff revenues. 
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with the pollution externality, ΔPC. The change in this latter term is always positive, because 
dθ/dt≤0 and the full adoption makes the pollution parameter equal to zero, i.e., θ=0⇒PC=0. 
Notice that the change in social welfare will be positive if the change in the tariff revenue net of 
pollution costs more than compensate for the negative effect of managed protection on the 
consumer surplus. However, in that case, private incentives to adopt the cleaner technology could 
be insufficient from the social welfare point of view. This means that eq. (21) is positive for the 
values the indexed θ can take, but there are some values for the sunk cost F at which adoption, 
though desirable, does not necessarily take place22. 
2.5 Endogenous number of domestic adopting firms 
In this section I will examine the main effects of changing the number of domestic and foreign 
firms, upon the optimal trade tariff, the private incentives and the social welfare of adopting the 
cleaner technology. Moreover, I will consider a subcase in which I am determining endogenously 
the number of home adopting firms. For that purpose, I will have δ domestic firms adopting the 
high technology and n-δ not adopting it. These n domestic firms will compete in the third stage 
with m foreign firms in the domestic market. The timing of the game is like the general case. I will 
analyze the subgame perfect equilibrium in each of the three stages. 
3. Third Stage: firms compete à la Cournot 
    Like in the general case, I assume that all domestic firms are symmetric and the choice of 
technology does not affect marginal costs. In fact, without loss of generality, I will assume that the 
marginal costs are constant and equal to zero for the sake of simplicity. Additionally, I will assume 
a specific inverse demand function of the linear type where P(Q)=a-bQ, where a=1=b. Then, the 
profit functions of every representative firm take the following form: 
Domestic representative adopting firm: 
πi=P(Q)qi-F, for any i=1,2,...,δ.      (22) 
πj=P(Q)qj,for any δ+1,...,n.             (23) 
Foreign representative firm: 
πk=P(Q)qk-tqk, for any k=1,...,m.   (24) 




mqk)     (25) 
Again, at this stage of the game, conjectures are of the Cournot type. In order to get the reaction 
functions, I solve for the first order conditions considering that domestic and foreign firms are 
                                                          
22 See the graph of the last proposition. 
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symmetric23.Then for the non-pollutant domestic firms and after solving simultaneously the 
reaction functions I obtain the output levels in equilibrium for each type of firm: 
qd
H=(1+mt)/(1+m+n)   (26) 
qd
L=(1+mt)/(1+m+n)    (27) 
qf=(1-t(n+1))/(1+m+n)   (28) 
It is clear from eqs. (26), (27) and (28) that the effect of the trade tax in each of the output levels 
affects positively the output of domestic firms and negatively the output of the foreign firm24. 
With this information we obtain: 
P=(1+tm)/(1+ m+n)  (29) 
Q=(n+m(1-t))/(1+ m+n)   (30) 
Similarly, substituting those output values in each profit function we have for the non-pollutant 
domestic firm: 
πi=(1+mt/1+ m+n)²-F, for any i=1,2,...,δ.   (31) 
for the pollutant domestic firm: 
πj=(1+mt/(1+ m+n)², for any j=δ+1,...,n.   (32) 
and for the foreign representative firm: 
πk=(1+tm)(1-t[n+1])/[1+ m+n]², for any k=1,2,...,m. (33) 
3.1 Second stage: optimal trade tax 
At this stage of the game, government chooses the optimal trade tax maximizing a social welfare 
function that includes, as is usual, the consumer surplus, profits of the domestic firms, the trade 
tax revenue and the costs associated with pollution emissions. It is important to recall that if 
domestic firms adopt the cleaner technology, it has been assumed that pollution emissions are 




L     (34) 
After totally differentiating eq. (34) with respect to t for a given θ, i.e., dW(t,θ)/dt=0, we obtain: 
topt=((1+2n)-θ(n-δ)(1+ m+n))/(2(1+n)²+m)    (35) 
Aiming at having an interior solution the degree of adoption must take the valueθ<(1+2n)/(n-δ)(1+ 
m+n), which naturally occurs because θ∈[0,1]. Therefore, the optimal tax is clearly positive. 
                                                          
23








qk=mqf, where d and f stands for 
domestic and foreign production or firms; respectively, and H stands for "high" or clean technology, whereas 
L for "low" or dirty technology. 
24
 Notice that superscripts H and L stand for "high technology" and "low technology", in other words, for 
adopting and not adopting firms. 
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Proposition 3: The larger the number of adopting firms δ, the higher the level of the optimal trade 
tax will be. 
Proof: By taking the partial derivative of the optimal trade tax with respect to parameter δ: 
∂topt/∂δ=θ(1+m+n)/[2(1+n)²+m]>0. 
Proposition 4: The larger the number of not adopting firms (n-δ), the lower the level of the optimal 
trade tax will be. 
Proof: By taking the partial derivative of the optimal trade tax with respect to parameter (n-δ): 
∂topt/∂(n-δ)=-θ(1+m+n)/[2(1+n)²+m]<0. 
On the other hand, comparing the domestic firm's incentives to invest in the non-polluting 
technology, any single domestic firm compares the net benefit of full adoption versus not adopting 
at all the cleaner technology: 
Φi≡πi(θ=0)-πi(θ=1)≥F, for any i=1,...,n.   (36) 
Therefore, when comparing this private benefit with the sunk cost F, there is a threshold for 
adoption: the lower the sunk cost F is, the higher the degree of adoption the domestic firm will 
take. Naturally, the i-th firm will invest in the cleaner technology if and only if F<Φi. 
Comparing the change in the domestic welfare net of the net producer surplus from adopting 
versus not adopting the cleaner technology: 
ΔW-(Φ₁-F)=ΔCS+Δ(TR-PC)        (37) 
Equation (37) for the specific case where n=1=m allows us to see the expected result: 
ΔW-(Φ₁-F)=7θ(8-θ)/162      (38) 
which is no negative given that θ∈[0,1]. 
Proposition 5: Private incentives are insufficient to adopt the cleaner technology from the point of 
view of the domestic welfare, specifically when the sunk cost of adoption F lies in the range 
(Φi,ΔW)  
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Finally, assuming free entry to get the endogenous number of adopting firms, I analyze the 
benefits of any adopting firm net of sunk costs for a given indexed value of θ, when benefits for 
this firm are equal to zero to get the maximum number of adopting firms, i.e., 
πi=(2(1+n)²+m+m[(1+2n)-θ(n-δ)(1+ m+n)])/(2(1+n)²+m)(1+ m+n))²-F=0, for any i=1,2,…,δ. (38) 
which implies that the number of adopting firms obtained is: 
δ=[2(1+n)²+m]{(1+ m+n)√F-1}-m(1+2n-θn(1+ m+n))/θm(1+ m+n), for any θ∈(0,1].  (39). 
4. Conclusion 
    The mechanism that allows domestic firms to adopt the cleaner technology, is strongly linked 
with the credibility that the limited commitment the domestic government sets up. The managed 
trade regime grants protection aiming at abating pollution from the production externality. In this 
context, liberalizing international trade could be counterproductive since a minimum rate of 
protection is needed to make that threat credible for the domestic producer to adopt, in certain 
degree, the cleaner technology, as long as the sunk cost F does not exceed the producer surplus. 
Notably, even though the model can be thought of for a small open economy -as in this paper-, 
the tariff that is obtained from the managed trade protection regime in the presence of 
production externalities is different from zero, as is usual when modelling small open economies 
in a context of imperfect competition. Precisely, the government's threat to be credible, requires a 
positive level of protection, otherwise, it would not be credible and the alleged managed 
protection will not have the expected adoption results. However, even in the case of a big open 
economy, the level of protection must be higher than that obtained from a non-cooperative 
solution as long as the domestic government needs to keep its limited commitment to grant extra 
protection to adopt the cleaner technology. 
The domestic welfare behaves as expected when the domestic pollution parameter takes some 
values to favor interior solutions for the output levels and the specific trade tax. In those cases, it 
is clear that even though the effects of the managed protection are well known as distortionary, 
those are clearly compensated as long as the sunk costs do not exceed the gross benefits from 
adopting the cleaner technology. For the policy maker, to maintain credibility on the level of 
protection granted, is crucial to avoid negative effects that may exacerbate opening trade 
processes upon the environment: a free-trade policy could be counterproductive for the domestic 
firm to adopt, since the incentives to adopt are null. 
This model clearly can be extended if I allow pollutant technologies of production in the foreign 
country, so that governments play a subgame simultaneously choosing the levels of protection, 
while firms play à la Cournot, being at the same time, followers whether adopting or not the 
cleaner technology through the protection granted in the second stage. 
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